Facultad Experimental de Ciencias. Universidad del Zulia. Resumen The demographic growth in the seventeenth century and population growth rates increased until the end of the 20th century. It was the first time to de- termine fertility in Europe, followed by other countries such as Japan, East Asian countries and other countries that wished to find a balance between population growth and the growth of other complementary sectors.
These de- mographic changes led to the re-shaping of the different sectors of population, especially the economic ones. However, most of the third world countries have continued to grow their population, which has generated many economic and social problems. This has been accompanied by security and political unrest and the illegal immigration of their youth, which has directly affected the sys- tems and laws of the immigrant countries.
We used in this study, the United Nations publications on demographic changes, their presentation and analy- sis, as well as the use of some statistical equations, were adopted. Based on the data collected in the final chart above, speculate in which stage of the classic demographic transition model each of these countries would fall.
The underlying premise of the classic Demographic Transition Model is that all countries will eventually pass through all four stages of the transition, just as the countries of Europe did. Because the countries of Europe, as well as the United States, have achieved economic success and enjoy generally high standards of living, completion of the demographic transition has come to be associated with socioeconomic progress.
Census Bureau International Data Base ]. Given this definition: does a model represent reality or is it a framework against which reality can be measured or evaluated? Now return to the original questions to discuss the classic Demographic Transition Model.
Is the Demographic Transition Model useful as a framework for evaluating demographic change in regions outside Europe and the United States?
Is it necessary that all countries share the experiences of Europe and the United States in order to pass through a demographic transition? Is the socioeconomic change experienced by industrialized countries a prerequisite or a consequence of demographic transition? Are there multiple ways to achieve a similar end? Resource Library. Instead, it became abundantly clear that sub-replacement fertility, and even the extra low versions of it, could last for a very long time.
The relational cohort model of observed postponement and partially incomplete recuperation did not lead to any optimistic expectations. In this article, the authors claimed that improvements in the level of human development, as measured through the UN Human Development Index HDI , in the lower fertility countries would produce a bouncing back to levels more commonly observed among countries with the higher HDI values.
This is shown in Fig. Especially, the Scandinavian countries with high HDI values and fertility closer to replacement during the first decade of the twenty-first century constituted the reference points.
The problem with that view is that it was based on measurements in a cross-section. This concept refers to the fact that there is a frequent fallacy in the social sciences whereby a future evolution is proposed based on a single and static cross-sectional pattern, i. Split correlation emerges when two distinct clusters are present. There is essentially no correlation within each cluster, but the overall regression slope is significantly different from zero simply because it runs through the lower and upper clusters combined.
Split correlation is indicative of the fact that the X variable is not a causal antecedent of Y and that the explanation has to be sought elsewhere, i. The elongated lower fertility cluster B in red is composed of the mainly German-speaking countries, the Southern European regions and those of the former communist countries FCCs , including the Baltic states and the Russian Federation.
In what follows in the rest of this article , we will continue using this A - and B - cluster reference. Source: Lesthaeghe and Permanyer In , the two clusters are already clearly visible, with just some 5 B-cluster regions having PTFRs of 1. In , the two clusters become even more distinct with only 3 B-cluster regions with PTFR levels above 1. More importantly, both clusters move to the right, indicating improvements in the HDI.
By , the B-cluster scores noticeably higher on the HDI, but remains totally distinct from the regions of cluster A. In other words , despite markedly improving HDI values in cluster B , there is no convergence whatsoever to fertility levels of cluster A.
This can only be done for entire countries for lack of more detailed regional indicators. We use 8 indicators, i. Footnote 16 In Table 1 we report the correlation coefficient between the PTFRs and the eight indicators, first for both clusters of countries together, and then for each cluster separately. Typical for the feature of split correlation is that these relationships vanish when measured within clusters. There are only two exceptions in cluster A and none in cluster B.
The negative correlation with the SDT indicator in cluster A refers to the period — when France and Ireland had higher fertility than the 4 Nordic countries. The overall positive correlation between the PTFR and the Sobotka SDT index is explained by the fact that the cluster A countries had higher values on both variables than most countries in the B cluster.
These findings for the first decade of the twenty-first century point to the possible relevance of gender equality for further exploration.
But can this sole factor account for rising fertility? One of the remarkable observations since the formulation of the SDT in is that the relationship between fertility and female employment rates reversed: initially, the relationship was negative, and now it is positive among European countries. However, the fertility postponement did not start in the industrialised countries at the same time.
Those with higher female labour force participation and high SDT scores lead the postponement movement. Source: Courtesy of Tomas Sobotka. The Nordic postponement leaders were the first with PTFR values to drop below replacement level, immediately followed by the rest of North-Western Europe. All this happened in the period — In Southern Europe, fertility postponement came later, and PTFRs dropped below replacement level only in the late s.
The strong negative correlation between period fertility and female labour force participation , as observed in the period — , is a direct result of the timing differences in the onset of postponement. Early postponers had the highest female labour force participation and the higher SDT scores, as theoretically expected. Countries with low female labour force participation were later postponers and had the higher fertility, hence the negative relationship between the PTFRs and female labour force participation.
But this masked the underlying positive relationship between both higher female labour force participation and cultural dimensions of the SDT at one hand and the earlier onset of fertility postponement at the other. This caused the reversal of the relationship between period fertility and female labour force participation.
Clearly, not only fertility postponement but also very differential recuperation at older ages played a role and aggravated the split between the A and B clusters. This is depicted in Fig. The oblique iso-lines give the total fertility per women from ages 20 to 39, and this approximates the cohort experience.
Except for the very strong postponement in Italy and Spain, and to a lesser degree also in Greece and Switzerland, cluster A and cluster B countries had similar distributions of fertility levels in the 20—29 age group in Why did this duality between the A and B clusters develop? Was it because the A cluster of countries solely scored better on gender equality, or were there other factors at work, for instance dealing with policies reducing female opportunity cost of labour force participation, subsidising child-rearing expenditures or diminishing the work-family time stress via early and universal child care and schooling?
Footnote 20 That stress can also be alleviated through more generalised part-time labour force participation, as in the Netherlands, the UK and Australia McDonald, Or where macro-economic forces at work such as uncertainty caused by a globalising economy Footnote 21 and by weaker employment positions of young adults?
Or were economic crises responsible for falls in period fertility levels at the younger ages? In what will follow , we will argue that the gender revolution could be a necessary , but by no means a sufficient ingredient for maintaining a stable PTFR level above 1. In fact , men doing more housework is only one , albeit a major component of a broader package of factors diminishing the work - family stress.
The crucial variable for these authors is then the advancing from an incomplete to a complete gender revolution. Secondly, they argue that this second phase of the gender revolution would strengthen the family, and that therefore other reversals are taking place, such as diminishing divorce. Footnote 22 The SDT as originally described would be a good characterisation of the earlier phase, but its prediction of sustained below replacement fertility would be falsified when the second phase of the gender revolution comes into play.
This was forcefully predicted by G. At that conference, the author contended that a U-shaped curve was in the making, with the right upward arm representing rising fertility directly as a result of advancing gender equality. Obviously, the Scandinavian countries are in the lead with respect to the transition from the first to the second stage of the gender revolution.
More specifically, the ratios of female over male hours of domestic work for European Union member states around were already below 2 in Sweden 1. In other words, fertility differences in cluster A countries cannot be accounted for by differences in male involvement in domestic work.
Also, there is a PTFR rise during the first decade of the new century. Footnote 25 But, as shown in Table 2 , that rise is evident in all countries of cluster A , i. Also, the presumed U-shaped pattern is based on cross-sections, and not on an evolution over time. During the second decade of this century, however, there is a substantial fall in the fertility levels affecting all cluster A countries.
Initially this was attributed to the economic recession, but the decline manifested itself all the way through the decade. Finish fertility dropped below 1. The UK, Denmark and Belgium managed to remain above 1. Evidently, the optimistic view based on any advancing gender revolution got thwarted during the last decade: the Nordic countries were not more robust than others despite their more advanced position on the gender revolution scale.
These findings cast doubt on the Goldscheider et al. This is also echoed by Hellstrand et al. Fertility declines above age 30 had hitherto never occurred in the Nordic countries.
Evidently, they are currently systematically diverging from the long-term pattern of stable and higher fertility. The authors find no signs of declining gender equality or of weakening family policies. In fact, in most Nordic countries, fathers tend to take full advantage of parental leave and most children are enrolled in day care from an early age. They furthermore show that decreasing first births are the main driver of the decline in period fertility, and therefore speculate that voluntary childlessness could be on the increase.
Very much the same observations were made for Finland where the PTFR dropped to an all-time low of 1. Also in that country, a quantum decline is responsible and not further postponement. These observations are a far cry from the optimist theory based on the Esping-Anderson U-curve with fertility increases being driven by advancing gender equality.
This contrasts with a multitude of additional factors , both structural and ideational , that in conjunction cause sub - replacement fertility. In other words , gender equality is a major element in the explanation , Footnote 26 but by no means a sufficient one. Furthermore, judging from the trends after , also the gender revolution theory overplayed its hand in predicting a fertility increase.
The SDT theory essentially predicted a structural, long-term pattern of below replacement fertility, even for cohorts and not just for periods. It is not an optimist theory as it recognised the existence of major forces, both of a social structural as well as ideational nature, which would keep fertility levels down in industrialised societies. Obviously, the version of the theory could not predict the dual fertility pattern in Europe and its persistence since the s, nor the very low fertility in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and China.
Entering a consensual union involves a moral choice and presupposes a high degree of individual autonomy. The postponement of parenthood, by contrast, generally does not run counter to the prevailing cultural code. Only childlessness is subject to cultural stigmatisation, and its spreading requires a cultural reversal in the same way cohabitation does.
On the whole, the rise of cohabitation is more contingent on ideational changes than the emergence of the SDT low fertility pattern. The major critique levelled at the SDT explanation of rising cohabitation concerns the source of its increase after Also, the economic crises in Latin American countries of the s and the shift to capitalism in the FCCs during the s were advanced as prime causes of the rise of cohabitation in these regions.
The latter argument pertaining to the respective s and s crises is the weakest one, since the trend toward more cohabitation in the respective regions is a singular and uninterrupted one till today. This trend is currently affecting young cohorts who were still babies or were not yet born at the time of these crises.
Also, there is no spurt in the cohabitation trend immediately following the respective crises, and in the Latin American instance, several countries witnessed an acceleration in their upward cohabitation trend only after the year The argument that the source of the cohabitation rise was not necessarily the educated elite holds more water in various regions and warrants further inspection.
In the discussion of the POD versus the SDT explanations for rising cohabitation use is commonly made of the education-related profiles. The European data commonly stem from sample surveys, and in what follows the results are based on the Gender and Generations Survey harmonised data set.
The indicator is the share of cohabitation among all unions i. In this way, we eliminate short-term cohabitation among younger women and obtain a more robust measurement of longer-term cohabitation in more established unions. The overall evolution of this share of cohabitation is depicted in Fig. Norway is at the top and Germany at the bottom of this group. Footnote 28 The second group is made up of the rest of Europe, with a later take-off date in the s, and generally with a slower development thereafter.
In this group, Spain is in the lead, whereas Italy, Poland and Romania are at the tail of the distribution. Data: Gender and Generations Survey harmonised data and national surveys.
The education profiles use 3 groups based on the ISCED codes, Footnote 29 and the results for the same indicator among women 25—29 are given in Fig. As expected on the basis of the SDT theory, the best educated group of women 25—29 is continuously in the lead from the start onward in Western countries: Netherlands, Austria, France, Belgium, and also Germany.
Rather flat profiles are found for Norway and the UK with minor shifts in the pattern of the gradients by education. There are also interesting contrasts. For instance, Spain also follows the positive gradient and advances far more rapidly than Italy.
Data: Gender and Generation Survey harmonised data and national surveys. Typical are Bulgaria, Romania and Russia. The exception appears to be Hungary, where the advances are more pronounced among the higher education group.
However, equally relevant is the subsequent emerging of a V - shaped pattern indicative of a catching up by the better educated. This later V-shape is present in virtually all FCCs considered here. On the whole, Fig. Footnote 30 Obviously , pre - marital cohabitation spreads rapidly across all layers of population , and as a consequence , the POD versus SDT discussion becomes irrelevant once the trend starts accelerating. The data for the US stem from the censuses of and and are basically best estimates.
Thereafter, we can rely on direct questions in the American Community Surveys ACS for the years — pooled data. On the whole, the incidence of cohabitation is lower in the US than in any of the other countries on the entire American continent, and lower than in Western European countries.
This pattern has been maintained over time, but is weakening in relative terms as the overall incidence of 25—year-old women cohabiting more than trebled from to — see Table 3.
The negative education-related gradient witnessed in the US censuses stems in part from the high cohabitation prevalence among the black population, as also shown in Table 3. The middle education group complete high school, some university has the largest gains in rates of cohabitation across this period, and has come at par with the lowest education group.
The proportion among those with at least a university degree also doubled. As with European countries, the overall rise in rates of cohabitation in the US is considerably more important than the educational differences. This is in line with the much earlier, but forgotten, observation by Macklin that cohabitation had expanded among college students during the turbulent s as well.
As age advances i. The provinces with the lowest incidence of cohabitation Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia exhibit a slightly negative educational gradient in but there was no such negative gradient in Quebec is the exception: a higher proportion of the better-educated cohabitated, and as a result this francophone province followed the Western European SDT pattern.
As is well known, many Latin American populations had significant proportions of consensual unions well before the cohabitation boom started in Europe and North America after The custom of cohabitation was mainly concentrated in the poorest strata. There also were important differences in rates of cohabitation between ethnic groups, with notably high rates among indigenous populations with hunter-gatherer or nomadic backgrounds, as well as the black populations.
Also racially mixed populations tend to have extant traditions of consensual unions. These high rates of cohabitation contrast with the low rates among better-educated white populations, such as the late nineteenth and twentieth century European immigrants in the Southern Cone of South America Uruguay, Argentina, Chile who strengthened the institution of marriage.
Furthermore, the European marriage became a mark of upward social mobility. The net result is that all Latin American countries, whether rich or poor, exhibit a negative education-related gradient. The question is whether this POD pattern has been strengthened during the cohabitation boom years, or whether the better-educated strata have been catching up. After four decades of observation the emerging outcome is quite clear: in most countries both the middle education groups and those with university education have experienced rapid rises in the proportions currently cohabiting at ages 25—29, i.
Of course, there are differences between the various countries as far as the orders of magnitude of POD and SDT are concerned. A few examples will illustrate this. Any subsequent large rises could only be among those with higher levels of education see Fig. A different pattern is evident in Brazil, where the largest increases in cohabitation between and were concentrated among the less educated, with only a modest increase among the better educated.
In the Brazilian case , the POD pattern has been accentuated over time. A similar enhanced POD pattern also holds for Venezuela. In contrast, in Ecuador, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Peru and especially in Colombia, the largest increases in rates of cohabitation were in the middle education groups, i. In another group made up of Costa Rica, Argentina, Mexico, and Chile, the initial rises in cohabitation began in the s and s, and tended to be concentrated among the least educated i.
The case of Uruguay Fig. In fact, the Uruguayan experience of a sudden rapid rise in cohabitation closely resembles that of Quebec in Canada. The share of consensual unions among all unions among women 25—29, according to education. Latin American populations, — Source: Esteve et al. To sum up, with the exception of Brazil and Venezuela, the POD gradients of the other Latin American cases have altered over time as the middle and better educated, including those with university degrees, have been catching up after However, the education gradients are still negative around , as this catching up phase among the upper strata is presumably still in progress.
Only in Uruguay has the new gradient become education neutral by as a consequence of the rapid rise in cohabitation in all population strata after Finally, in several Latin American countries there is consistency between rising rates of cohabitation and ideational changes from the s to the s reflecting greater social liberalism across all education levels.
Footnote 31 The ideational changes were especially marked among those with higher education. Although not measured in the WVS surveys, it is most likely that also the de-stigmatisation of cohabitation among the better educated is part of this ideational evolution.
The fact that pre-marital cohabitation spread to several Pacific Asian societies from the s onwards might come as a surprise, as hitherto cohabitation had been viewed very negatively. Footnote 32 It did not fit with the cohesively structured patriarchal traditions. Footnote 33 However, the proportions of the population married below age 30 had been falling since the s and sometimes to very low levels e. Jones, The Japanese Generations and Gender Survey GGS of confirmed the findings of increasing rates of cohabitation, and the Japanese Survey on Family and Economic Conditions probed even further by inserting a question about the first step toward a relationship commitment, being one of three possibilities: a pregnancy, a period of cohabitation, or direct transition to marriage without prior cohabitation.
There are some limitations on the available data on the gradient of cohabitation by education in Japan: we only have a single time point report on the proportions ever cohabited among those ever in a union see Table 4 , column 4. Percentages by age of current cohabitation among those currently in a union, as in the European and Latin American instances, could not be found.
The results for Japan nevertheless indicate that already before the turn of the century a major change had occurred in the patterns of union formation. Among the older cohorts we effectively move back in history, and find a steady rise in cohabitation among those ever in a union, and since the s, an even more marked rise in bridal pregnancies and marriages occurring when the bride is pregnant. There is also evidence on the education gradient of the chance of a pre-marital pregnancy or birth for ever-married women by age.
These data demonstrate a classic negative education gradient for both pre-marital cohabitation and pregnancy. That is, those women with lower education are more likely to cohabit or have a pre-marital pregnancy than those with higher education.
Particularly for women with a university degree, the chance of either cohabitation or pre-marital pregnancy is only about half that for the female population as a whole Tsuya, Additional evidence on patterns of union formation is provided by the Japanese Survey on Family and Economic Conditions, some of which is summarised in Table 5.
Among women aged 20—49 who had experienced at least one step in the family formation process, i. Furthermore, among highly educated women, cohabitation prior to marriage is associated with later childbearing within marriage. There needs to be more recent analyses of social trends to find out what happened during the last decade through to and to detect whether or not the new cohorts of college educated Japanese women have been increasing rates of cohabitation relative to their predecessors.
This process of increasing rates of cohabitation among the better educated has happened in so many other countries, it might well be happening in Japan as well. This was a surprising finding in a largely Catholic country where both abortion and divorce are illegal. It is not clear whether the census underestimated the incidence of cohabitation, or whether the DHS was biased in the opposite direction. At any rate, whatever the source, it is clear that pre-marital cohabitation is quite common in the Philippines Fig.
The Philippines: percentage of women currently cohabiting among women currently in a union married or cohabitating by age. However, Kuong et al. Given the much higher percentages of women who have never been in a union among the wealthier and more educated groups than in to the more disadvantaged groups, the reported negative slope of the gradient is exaggerated. In fact, when only women already in a union cohabiting or married are included in the denominator, the share of cohabitation no longer follows a negative gradient by education and wealth in but turns into an inverted U-shaped pattern.
This is illustrated in Table 6. Furthermore, given the strong Catholic stigmatisation of cohabitation, there might be many women who falsely report being single rather than acknowledge their cohabitation, and this might be more common among the better educated, wealthier parts of the population.
Finally, it should be noted that there may also be some historical effect of cohabitation being acceptable among some ethnic minorities as well, which could explain a part of the incidence of cohabitation among the lower education groups. The Chinese experience of cohabitation follows a different track.
Although it was intended that modernisation would occur for the entire country, the policies of rapid development were mainly implemented in coastal areas and provincial capitals. In addition there were high rates of internal immigration from rural areas to the developing regions, which weakened traditional forms of social control.
For example, Liu et al. Finally, there also seems to be a shift from a collectivist outlook to much greater individual autonomy Yan, , In the context of these social changes, it is should not come as a surprise that rates of pre-marital cohabitation increased.
Relative to traditional marriage, cohabitation offers freedom of partner choice, sexual gratification, economies of scale in consumption and housing expenditures and potentially lower exit costs if the relationship does not work out. Moreover, as there is no evidence of substantial rates of pre-existing forms of cohabitation, there is presumably no significant locked-in effect of any historical legacy, as was the case of Latin America.
The net result is the absence of the negative education gradient in the cohabitation pattern as shown in Table 7 with data from the round of the Chinese Family Panel study CFPS.
It should be noted that the percentages ever-cohabiting reported in Table 7 , and provided by Yu and Xie, are related to the total number of women in the age groups, and not just to the more commonly used number of women in a union cohabiting and married. This means that recent percentages in the youngest two age groups are systematically lower than those reported previously since the larger numbers of single women in these age groups are inflating the denominators.
Despite this drawback it is still obvious that the percentages with a pre-marital cohabitation experience have been rising systematically in each successive cohort. The highest rate of cohabitation is among women with the most education, i. The lowest cohabitation rate is witnessed in women without any education, who are illiterate or only partially literate. Presumably the least educated are disproportionally present in rural areas, which are more traditional and have not been exposed to outside influences to the same extent as the coastal cities or larger provincial urban areas.
It should also be noted that there is a major shift in the educational composition of the five age groups presented in Table 7. Hence in China the combination of a positive education gradient of cohabitation and the upward shift in educational attainment across cohorts reinforces the expansion of cohabitation as a mode of family formation.
From the analyses of trends just presented, it is clear that the paths followed by rising cohabitation in Japan and China are very different, with the latter conforming more to the original SDT script of the s. Also, the mean duration of cohabitation was limited. This suggests that both countries were in a phase in which cohabitation was increasing in frequency and acceptability, and there might well be increasing duration of cohabitation in both countries, as had happened across many other countries.
Whether China is currently joining the Japanese pattern of more pre-marital pregnancies and subsequent abortions or shotgun marriages cannot be ruled out but still needs to be documented. But on the whole, there is still a missing SDT component in both countries: procreation among cohabitants.
However, more surprises may happen. Sub-Saharan populations, including several Islamised ones, Footnote 39 have forms of social and lineage organisation that are the complete opposite of those in Asia. Christianity and urbanisation have altered these traditional arrangements. The former has tried to turn marriage into a single celebration, i.
Rapid urbanisation and substantial labour migration flows, by contrast, have had the opposite effect with large numbers of men, both single and married, vying for sexual gratification. Hence, it is not a straight POD type of union, but an urban manifestation of autonomy by young adults. It can also be a way for both women and men to maintain their economic independence.
High separation rates lead, furthermore, to large numbers of single-mother families and to more out-fostering of children. Hence, it may well be that, depending on context, cohabitation in sub-Saharan Africa can be more of either type, POD or SDT, or of both types combined. On the whole, the historical kinship organisation of the sub-Saharan populations will be favourable to both short- and long-term cohabitation further displacing the Christian or the traditionally negotiated marriage.
Moreover, partnerships will retain their multiple forms as is already the case today, and the shifts away from classic legally or customarily recognised marriage seem to be on an ascending track. However, the main issue for sub-Saharan Africa is to advance its fertility transition, especially since many large West-African populations have barely started it.
Historically cohabitation was stigmatised in populations with an Asian patriarchal or European conjugal marriage tradition. This involves a de-stigmatisation of divorce, abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia and suicide. The degree of resistance to any circumstantial evaluation of these ethical features can be gleaned from the World Values Survey data WVS of the first decade of this century.
The total length of the bars corresponds to the sum of these five percentages. Degree of ethical conservatism: sum of percentages never justifying NJ homosexuality, abortion, divorce, euthanasia and suicide.
It is also manifesting itself in Spain, but less so in Italy. In the latter group, Serbia and Bulgaria have witnessed a greater degree of de-stigmatisation than the others countries reported here. The difference between Bulgaria and Romania mirrors that between Spain and Italy, and in both pairs the first mentioned countries have a noticeably higher incidence of cohabitation coupled to a significantly more liberal ethics profile.
The Latin American countries are currently still more conservative than their European counterparts, and this is equally connected to a lower degree of secularisation. This also brings out once more the importance of the locked-in facilitating factor, i.
But, as mentioned before, the trend in ethical matters since the early s goes in the direction of de-stigmatisation. The diffusion of more tolerant attitudes is top-down, i. Given this top-down diffusion of liberal ethics, it is likely that the catching up with respect to cohabitation among the better-educated social strata may continue and result in a greater flattening of the education gradient. This trend may also be accompanied by a postponement of fertility among the more educated women, in which case a further step along the lines of the SDT would be taken.
Among the Confucian and Buddhist countries listed in Fig. This is an unexpected and puzzling finding given the high degree of secularisation of the Chinese population. Also Vietnam has maintained a more conservative position. South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan are at par, and Thailand has advanced slightly further on the de-stigmatisation path.
These are all candidates for an incipient take-off or further expansion of cohabitation as a prelude to marriage, but probably not yet for accepting unmarried motherhood.
As described previously, India and all the Muslim countries have strong patriarchal forms of family organisation with weaker female positions.
In addition, large segments of their female populations are persistently characterised by low education. When paired to a rigorist ethical stance, the expectations for the acceptability of pre-marital cohabitation are slim, notwithstanding the fact that some countries have completed their fertility transition e.
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